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What Is Kant's Refutation of Idealims Designed to Refute?
Abstract
The seemingly simple question that constitutes the title of this paper has not been appropriately
answered by many commentators. Often it is just presupposed that Kant's Refutation of Idealism is
directed against a "sceptical" position modelled more or less closely on Descarte's First Meditation.
Here it will be argued that the real target is the Second Meditation. In addition, the view will be
defended that the argument is not appropriate to decide the questio facti whether there are external
objects or not. It rather establishes that inner experience is conceptually dependent on perception of
external objects. As a consequence, the argument does not preclude the possibility that some people are
brains in a vat, as Q. Cassam justly remarked. However, disagreement will be expressed with his views
on transcendental arguments in general.
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WHAT IS KANT’S REFUTATION OF IDEALISM DESIGNED TO REFUTE? 
 
Bernhard Ritter 
 
 
The passage that Kant added to the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in the second 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason can be approached by way of two of his 
designations. The first appears in a lengthy footnote to the preface and reads “a strict 
proof … of the objective reality of outer intuition,” or, more explicitly, “[a proof of] the 
existence of things outside us.”36 The second is the actual heading of the passage: “The 
Refutation of Idealism.” Each instance can be taken, however heuristically, to 
correspond to a distinct task of clarifying the import of the argument. 
The passage heading suggests that it is a matter of getting clear about the 
idealist’s position, and how the argument is intended to disprove it. This may be termed 
the negative import of the Refutation of Idealism, as it consists of understanding what it 
refutes and how. 
According to the footnote in the preface, the passage is a proof of “the existence 
of things outside us”. This phrase seems unequivocal, although, it will be argued that 
there is no proof from Kant that establishes a categorical existential proposition ranging 
over things outside us. Because Kant’s label is misleading, spelling out the conclusion 
may be useful. In any case, doing this and reconstructing how it is achieved is part of 
the positive import of the argument. Moreover, an account of the positive import should 
include an explanation of why external objects are required. 
 
1. Cassam on Kant 
Yet, there is a further question about the precedent step that leads to the cognition of 
external objects. It is not concerned with the Refutation of Idealism alone but with 
transcendental arguments in general: do they explain how empirical knowledge is 
possible? Cassim Cassam answers in the negative.37 To see how he supports his claim it 
                                                          
36 B XL. 
37 Cassam 2007 [= The Possibility of Knowledge]: vi, and section 2. 
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will serve to consider his outline of the Refutation as an instance of a transcendental 
argument, and how he comments it: 
Inner experience is a form of self-knowledge; it is knowledge of the temporal order of 
one’s experiences. Outer experience is perceptual knowledge of the existence of objects 
in space. Kant’s claim is that outer experience is a necessary condition for inner 
experience. So if the sceptic grants that he has inner experience, then he must also grant 
he has perceptual knowledge of external objects. (Cassam 2007: 54) 
 
 
Identifying the sceptic with the idealist for a moment, the quotation gives a rough idea 
of how the Refutation-argument works. One premise links (the possibility of) self-
awareness to the necessary condition that the subject be aware of external objects. Now, 
when the idealist denies direct awareness of external objects, he either suffers a modus 
tollens of self-awareness, which he thought independent of outer experience, or he must 
admit that he is aware of external objects. Obviously, this reasoning relies on 
demonstrating that the necessary condition really holds. Cassam comments: 
If this argument is successful, what it shows is that perceptual knowledge is necessary 
for inner experience but showing that perceptual knowledge is necessary for inner 
experience is not the same thing as explaining how perceptual knowledge itself is 
possible [.] (Cassam 2007: 55) 
 
Cassam identifies a mismatch between Kant’s how-possible questions and 
transcendental arguments that establish necessary conditions by way of answers. He 
suggests that transcendental arguments exceed the level of generality appropriate to 
yield an answer. Associated with, but not in direct support of this objection, Cassam 
argues that transcendental arguments are neither necessary nor sufficient to answer in 
particular the question of how perceptual knowledge is possible.38 
Cassam’s arguments in support of this latter claim will be considered in a 
moment. In reaction to the charge of excessive generality, I would like to suggest that it 
is due to asking too much of too brief a passage of the Critique. Taking even the 
transcendental deduction as a whole, why should it—considered in isolation—be the 
decisive unit for assessing Kant’s explanation for how perceptual knowledge is 
possible? Consider the following remark, which occurs at the very end of the 
transcendental deduction (in §27): 
                                                          
38 Cassam 2007: 52. 
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[T]he categories contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general from 
the side of the understanding. But more about how they make experience possible, and 
which principles (Grundsätze) of its possibility they yield in their application to 
appearances, will be taught in the following chapter (Hauptstück) on the transcendental 
use of the power of judgment. (B 167) 
 
Kant’s reference to the “following chapter” is inexact. What comes after is the 
Analytic’s second book, whose first chapter contains no statement of principles 
(Grundsätze). The chapter is exclusively concerned with what Kant calls the 
“schematism” of the categories. A schema is an aspect of our understanding of 
concepts. It is not a representation but a method of the imagination to engender a 
representation that is in accordance with the concept. The schema of e.g. “substance” 
gives rise to the representation of a permanent quantity of a something in time, “which 
… endures while everything else changes.”39 
The principles are only touched upon in the second chapter, by the application of 
the categories to appearances in general in accordance with their schematism. Thus I 
identify the “principles of [the] possibility [of experience]” in the quoted passage with 
the principles of pure understanding, among which the crucial explanatory work is done 
through the analogies of experience. Since Kant does not deem the possibility of 
perceptual knowledge to be conclusively established after the transcendental deduction 
(as the quoted passage indicates40), and seems to presuppose it in the Refutation, an 
assessment of his answer to the question of the possibility of perceptual knowledge 
needs to take into account the interrelation between the two and the principles of pure 
understanding. Within the constraints of this paper it will only be possible to say 
something about the analogies of experience (section V). 
How does Cassam support his claim that transcendental arguments are not 
necessary for explaining the possibility of perceptual knowledge? Cassam argues that 
the specification of ‘means of coming to know’, and the removing of obstacles for these 
as sources of knowledge is a perfectly good answer for epistemological how-possible 
questions.41 For example, to know that the tub is dipped is to possess a piece of 
empirical knowledge. We explain how empirical knowledge is possible by specifying 
                                                          
39 B 179f.; B 183/A 143f. 
40 For Kant “experience” is “empirical cognition” (empirische Erkenntnis), cf. B 147. There is more on 
Kant’s notion of experience in section V. 
41 Cassam 2007: 8. 
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empirical means of knowledge-acquisition. Since seeing that the tub is dipped is a 
means of coming to know that the tub is dipped, we have explained how knowing that 
the tub is dipped is possible by pointing out that seeing is an appropriate means for 
acquiring this piece of knowledge. This is a means-response, and Cassam believes that 
it is “in no obvious sense incomplete”.42 As a result, it is not necessary to go into 
transcendental reasoning to explain how perceptual knowledge is possible. Cassam 
recommends an approach he terms a multi-levels response. It consists of adding 
specifications of obstacle-removal to the means-response, as well as background 
conditions necessary for the means to be a source of knowledge.43 To avoid the 
instrumentalistic implications of “means of knowing” Cassam newly prefers the term 
“ways of knowing”.44 
I see a difficulty in maintaining that a means-response is “in no obvious sense 
incomplete” and that how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent.45 A how-possible 
question is related to the statement claiming that the state of affairs holds which the 
how-possible question questions. Let’s call it statement s. That the question is obstacle-
dependent means that it arises out of a conflict between s and a set of statements held 
true. The way in which s is precarious is determined by its relation to that set of 
statements. Consequently, for a means-response (with or without indications for 
obstacle-removal) to be “in no obvious sense incomplete” presupposes an obstacle. 
Given that the obstacle is ‘worries about appropriate means of knowing’, a means-
response is in no obvious sense incomplete. But let s be “there is mathematical 
knowledge” and the set of statements the following: 
1. mathematical knowledge is synthetic a priori 
2. experience yields synthetic but not a priori judgments 
3. analysis of concepts yields a priori but not synthetic judgments 
4. intuition cannot precede the intuited object 
Given the above, merely identifying pure intuition as a means for acquiring synthetic a 
priori knowledge is certainly an incomplete answer. It amounts to the bold assertion that 
it is possible by a “kind of experience before experience”. But that cannot be clear from 
                                                          
42 This phrase occurs repeatedly (cf. Cassam 2007: 48, 127, 218). 
43 Cassam 2007: 8f., 35, 51, 63 – 65. 
44 Lecture on the “Possibility of Self-Knowledge” at the University of Konstanz on 26th June 2008. 
45 Cf. Cassam 2007: 2. 
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intuition; or at least Kant would maintain that asking a philosophical question about the 
possibility of mathematical knowledge is not asking how mathematical calculations 
themselves work; instead, it means asking for a valid explanation of their objectivity. If, 
in addition, it is correct that in philosophy one proceeds a priori by means of concepts 
and not by intuitions,46 only an argument could possibly yield an answer. 
Thus, the more abstract propositions that you add to the list and the more 
intricate the obstacle, the more likely a means-response will look incomplete. That the 
example above was based on mathematics and not perceptual knowledge47 should not 
matter, since what is to count as a complete answer is dependent on the obstacle, and 
thus, on the set of statements (perceptual or not) that are held true. 
Still, given that the obstacle is ‘worries about appropriate means’, the Kantian 
approach is not necessary, and this is what Cassam claimed. However, it is doubtful 
whether Cassam actually wanted to claim this, because it would be arbitrary to assume 
that if Kant were asked e.g. how it was possible to know from the number of guests how 
many times they will clink glasses, he would add a transcendental deduction to his 
answer, or would think of it as incomplete if he did not. It is open to him to admit that 
there are other obstacles besides philosophical problems. 
But if both the obstacle and the alternative answer, such as the multi-levels 
response, are philosophical, then the matter is not so straightforward. It will be argued 
later in this paper that toning down the instrumentalistic implications and talking more 
generally of “ways of knowing” deprives Cassam of the conceptual means for giving 
reasons for why the Kantian approach should not be a kind of a multi-levels response, 
since the difference depends on being means-specific or not. Certainly, this does not 
preclude that transcendental arguments may not be necessary for answering 
epistemological how-possible questions. But, if they are not, still they could be relevant 
for answering them. 
How does Cassam support his claim that transcendental arguments are not 
sufficient to answer the question “how is perceptual knowledge possible?” (HPpk)? In 
Cassam’s interpretation, the Kantian approach accounts for the possibility of synthetic a 
                                                          
46 According to Kant, this is what distinguishes mathematical from philosophical cognition (cf. A 723f. 
/B 751f.). 
47 In response to Cassam 2007: 56. 
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priori knowledge, whereas the possibility of a posteriori knowledge is not one of its 
central concerns: 
Kant is an example of a philosopher who appears to think that (HPpk) lacks any 
respectable motivation. In his terms, perceptual knowledge would be synthetic a 
posteriori knowledge, but ‘the possibility of synthetic a posteriori judgments, of those 
which are gathered from experience … requires no special explanation; for experience 
is nothing but a continual joining together (synthesis) of perceptions’ ([Prol.] 275) If the 
possibility of synthetic a posteriori knowledge requires no special explanation, then 
(HPpk) simply doesn’t arise; there is no obstacle for it to trade on. (Cassam 2007: 22) 
 
In another instance where Cassam tries to justify this contention with reference to the 
quoted passage from Kant’s Prolegomena, he adds that in Kant’s introduction to the 
Critique, the possibility of experience is not included in the list of how-possible 
questions.48 
However, Cassam qualifies his claim in order to account for the anti-sceptical 
orientation of the Refutation-argument. Since perceptual cognition of external objects is 
exactly what is questioned by the sceptic (whom we provisionally identified with the 
idealist), it is obvious that Kant cannot assume perceptual knowledge of an external 
world, if his goal is to refute scepticism. According to Cassam, the Refutation-argument 
is, in this respect, “a special case” in not merely positing actual empirical knowledge of 
external objects and moving to its preconditions, but also giving an argument in support 
of the claim that we experience external objects.49 Cassam rightly remarks that to 
establish the empirical knowledge of external objects as a necessary condition for inner 
experience is not an explanation of the possibility of the latter. 
To summarize, transcendental arguments, when dealing with the possibility of 
perceptual knowledge of external objects, either (a) assume it to be something actual or 
(b) prove it to be a necessary condition for experience in general; in neither case is an 
explanation for the possibility of perceptual knowledge itself achieved. 
It can be agreed that (b) is an appropriate expression of the goal of the 
Refutation-argument. But no general conclusion that transcendental arguments are 
irrelevant for answering the question of how perceptual knowledge of external objects is 
possible, can be drawn. It has already been suggested that this is largely the design of 
the schematism and the principles of pure understanding. So the claim is that there is an 
                                                          
48 Cassam 2007: 58; B 19 – 24. 
49 Cassam 2007: 56f. 
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answer but not where Cassam is searching. There will be more on this matter in section 
V when touching on the analogies of experience. 
Cassam refers to (a) as the interpretation of transcendental arguments as 
“regressive arguments”.50 The somewhat excessive claim that the possibility of 
experience is not one of Kant’s central concerns means taking a further step, since (a) 
only presupposes that perceptual knowledge is possible; transcendental arguments could 
still address the question of how that is possible. But, according to Cassam, regressive 
transcendental arguments are not used by Kant to that end, particularly since, in the 
Prolegomena, he finds that “the possibility of synthetic a posteriori judgements … 
requires no special explanation”.51 
Granted, it is true that the Prolegomena are not concerned with the possibility of 
a posteriori judgments; still it could be a concern for the Critique, since the former 
proceed following the analytic or regressive method whereas the latter is laid out 
synthetically or progressively. The analytic method “proceeds from that which is sought 
as if it were given, and ascends to the conditions under which alone it is possible”;52 but 
“the work itself [i.e. the Critique] absolutely had to be composed according to the 
synthetic method”.53 Kant explicitly states that the Critique “takes no foundations as 
given except reason itself, and … therefore tries to develop cognition out of its original 
seeds without relying on any fact whatever”.54 This rules out an essential dependence on 
the assumption of actual empirical knowledge, irrespective of whether Kant’s 
“regressive method” and Cassam’s “regressive arguments” are the same or not.55 (One 
should note that there certainly are individual arguments and passages developed 
regressively in the Critique.) 
                                                          
50 Cassam 2007: 51 – 62 (section 2.1). The notion of “regressive arguments” is introduced in Cassam 
2007: 57 with reference to Ameriks 2003: 51, 55; cf. fn. 20, below. 
51 Prol. 275. 
52 Prol. 276. 
53 Prol. 263. 
54 Prol. 274. 
55 In fact these notions are different. According to Karl Ameriks, a “regressive argument would show that 
y is a necessary condition of knowledge x”; he adds that “it is not a radical argument from a premise not 
assuming the possession of knowledge” (Ameriks 2003: 60f.). If this is all a regressive argument is 
supposed to be, one could readily agree that at least some of Kant’s transcendental arguments are 
regressive. But thus defined, they could still be deductive arguments. The inference from “I know x, only 
if I know z” and “I know z, only if I know y” to “I know x, only if I know y” establishes deductively that 
my knowledge of y is a necessary condition of my knowledge of x, yet it is “regressive” in the sense 
explained above. 
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It may seem surprising that Kant omits the question “how is experience 
possible?” in the introduction to the Critique, especially when, in his posthumously 
published What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany?, he calls it “the 
supreme problem of transcendental philosophy”.56 But taking into account the heading 
of the introductory passage in question, section VI “The General Problem (Aufgabe) of 
pure reason”, a possible explanation emerges. The possibility of experience may not be 
a problem of pure reason, but be a problem—even the major problem—of 
transcendental philosophy. This is the case, if the solution of the problem of pure reason 
requires the solution of the problem of the possibility of experience. Here, it is not 
necessary to pursue the matter further. The passage quoted above from the end of the 
Deduction-passage already substantiates at least the relevance of the latter problem to 
the project of the Critique.57 
This section has dealt with some objections against the indispensability of 
transcendental reasoning to answer the question how empirical knowledge is possible. It 
was largely an attempt to show that these objections, at least in their present form, are 
not conclusive. The following section deals more extensively with the Refutation of 
Idealism as a transcendental argument. 
 
2.  The structure of the argument 
What is a transcendental argument? Kant gives three rules for permissible 
transcendental reasoning. First, a transcendental argument or proof does not show “that 
the given concept (e.g., of that which happens) leads directly to another concept (that of 
cause) …; rather it shows that the experience itself, hence the object of experience, 
would be impossible without such a connection.”58 Kant’s example in brackets evokes 
the Second Analogy of Experience: “All alterations occur in accordance with the law of 
                                                          
56 Ak. XX: 275. 
57 The quotation is from B 168; for further evidence see the lengthy footnote in the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science (Ak. IV: 474 – 476). 
58 A 783/B 811. The omitted comment preceding the semicolon gives the reason for the non licet stated 
by Kant: “for [the feasibility of] such a transition [from one concept to the other] nothing could be held 
responsible.” This thought will be taken up by the explicit statement of the first rule a few pages further 
(A 786/B 814), though only in order to address the (illegitimate) “transcendental proofs” of the 
transcendental dialectic. Consequently the explicit formulation of the rule is negative and less instructive 
than the one quoted above. 
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… cause and effect.” (B 232)59 The connection between “alteration” and “causality” in 
this conclusion is derived by means of a principle that declares it to be necessary for the 
experiencing of an object. This is the first distinctive mark of transcendental arguments. 
The second and third rule states “that for each transcendental proposition only a single 
proof can be found,” and “that [transcendental proofs] must never be apagogic but 
always ostensive.”60 An “apagogic” proof is a proof “by refutation of the opposite”. It 
starts with searching out propositions that are known to be wrong (owing to 
inconsistency or other reasons), but implied by the negation of the desired conclusion. A 
modus tollens refutes the antecedent proposition and yields—“by refutation of the 
opposite”—the desired result. In contrast, an ostensive proof establishes its result 
directly, ideally by affirmative premises.61 
The Refutation of Idealism meets the first criterion, which will become apparent 
from the presentation of the argument below. In Kant’s view it certainly meets the 
second criterion too, for he claims it to be “the only possible [proof]” of things outside 
us.62 But if the Refutation-argument meets the third criterion is not clear. Its underlying 
argument-structure allows for two negative premises, of which only one is actually 
stated. Kant presents the idealist as somebody who drops the premise that the perception 
of external objects is mediate and insecure, while self-awareness as a substance in time 
remains unaffected. Since the latter (that we possess self-knowledge) materially implies 
the former (that we sometimes perceive external objects), the idealist encounters a 
refutation of self-awareness. Dropping the denial that we perceive external objects, it 
follows that the perception of external objects is a necessary condition for self-
awareness. Hence the Refutation-argument is an ostensive proof, but its force is in part 
due to an apagogic proof held in position. Therefore, it may not be altogether clear if the 
Refutation of Idealism is a transcendental argument, not because it falls in between 
categories, but because it is too many things at once. 
The argument, then, can be paraphrased in a first attempt as follows: 
                                                          
59 This formulation of the second analogy gives the impression that Kant attempted to derive 
metaphysical claims from epistemological conditions; instead, it should actually be stated as a regulative 
principle (as an instruction on how to proceed) and as an analogy (x is related to a given alteration as 
cause to effect). 
60 A 787/B 815; A 789/B 817. The Guyer-Wood translation prefers to set Kant’s spacing in bold type. 
61 Ak. XX: 288; cf. Ak. IX: 52. 
62 B XLI. 
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(P1) to cognize my existence (Dasein) as a substance determined in time is possible, 
necessarily only if there is something permanent (etwas Beharrliches) in inner 
intuition (Anschauung) or outer perception (Wahrnehmung), 
(P2) it is false that there is something permanent in inner intuition; 
(C1) hence to cognize my existence as a substance determined in time is possible, 
necessarily only if there is something permanent in outer perception. 
(C1') To cognize my existence as a substance determined in time is possible, 
necessarily only if there are actual things in my outer perception. 
Formally, in order to obtain conclusion (C1) the antecedent of (P1) has to be introduced 
as an assumption. A modus ponens yields the disjunction “there is something permanent 
in inner intuition or outer perception”. According to (P2), the first component 
proposition is false; hence the second must be true. Here the argument relies on two 
general claims of the Critique: first, the exhaustive disjunction of inner and outer 
intuition—there is only spatial and temporal sensitivity; second, since only concepts 
and intuition can engender knowledge, a kind of intuition is required, if consciousness 
of oneself is to be knowledge.63 Since the statement “there is something permanent in 
outer perception” is derived on the basis of the assumption that “to cognize my 
existence as a substance determined in time is possible”, the latter has to be written as a 
sufficient condition of the former, which equals (C1). The specification “as a substance” 
only appears in the second note to the proof.64 Its interpretative addition to the 
paraphrase above will be justified in a moment. As represented in (C1'), Kant substitutes 
“actual things” for “something [permanent] in perception”.65 This should not be seen as 
an additional step but only as a gloss on conclusion (C1). 
As already touched upon in Cassam’s outline above, the aim of the argument is 
not to prove that outer sense really represents external objects, “for outer sense is 
already in itself a relation of intuition to something actual outside me”; instead, the aim 
is to establish that both are “inseparably bound up”.66 This inseparability is due to the 
                                                          
63 The second presupposition is made explicit in Kant’s second note to the proof (B 277f.). 
64 B 277f. 
65 B 276f. I prefer “permanent” to “persistent” as a translation of beharrlich. What Kant is looking for is 
not this or that object, which is actually persistent when viewed against a permanent backdrop, but the 
backdrop itself, i.e., the totality of physical substances. 
66 B XL. 
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necessity of something permanent in order to cognize (to think and intuit) oneself as a 
res or substance. In support of (P2), Kant writes “all grounds of determination that can 
be encountered in me are representations, and as such require something persistent that 
is distinct even from them, in relation to which their change … can be determined”.67 In 
the temporal succession of mere representations, no content determines the following 
content strictly; hence there is no unity to account for the subject as a substance. 
It has been remarked that the Refutation is not presented as an apagogic proof in 
the text. This could have been done easily by adding the idealist’s denial of immediate 
perception of permanent things in outer perception as a second negative premise. In that 
form, the Refutation-argument would have been 
a hypothetical inference, whose consequens is a disjunctive judgment. The hypothetical 
proposition whose consequens is disjunctive is the major proposition; the minor 
proposition affirms that the consequens (per omnia membra) is false, and the conclusion 
affirms that the antecedens is false.  (Ak. IX: 130) 
 
The quotation is from paragraph 79 (“Dilemma”) of the Jäsche Logic. In the note 
adjoined the paragraph Kant finds “something deceptive” in dilemmata, for “not to 
refute propositions directly but rather only to show difficulties [and to infer from 
difficulties to falsity] is feasible in many, indeed, most things”.68 It may have been for 
this reason that Kant presented his argument as a direct refutation, based on formerly 
established premises. 
The closing passage in the proof starts with the first complete sentence after the 
page brake B 275 to 276. The component after the “i[d] e[st]” is definitely a gloss on the 
conclusion, but the rest is difficult to assess. 
Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the 
possibility of this time-determination: Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the 
existence of things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the 
consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of 
the existence of other things outside me. (B 276) 
 
Taking a hint from the theorem,69 the consciousness in question is “empirical”, but not 
in the sense of including cognition of corporeal objects, otherwise the argument would 
presuppose what it is about to establish. In Kant’s terminology, “empirical 
                                                          
67 B XXXIX/B 275. 
68 Ak. IX: 131. Note that the term “dilemma” is not used in its ordinary sense by Kant. 
69 It starts with: “The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence…” (B 275) 
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consciousness” of oneself is empirical in that it is not only conceptual or rational but 
relies on inner sense, that is, it contains empirical representations through which the 
subject temporally determines itself.70 Considered in itself, the ego of empirical 
consciousness is purely formal; it is precisely and exclusively that which ascribes 
(intuitive) representations to itself. It is a structural feature of all representation in 
empirical consciousness: ego cogito cogitatum. 
The problem of interpreting the quoted passage lies in that to be conscious of 
something usually does not include the consciousness of whatever makes it possible. 
Moreover, the transition from consciousness in time to “things outside me” appears 
rather abrupt. This is where the conjecture from above becomes relevant that temporal 
consciousness has to be specified as “consciousness as a substance in time”. The 
empirical consciousness of oneself is necessarily related to a substance, since this is in 
what it must inhere. In order to cognize itself as a substance in time the subject has to 
view its intuitive representations as caused by spatio-temporal substances, of which its 
representations systematically depend. Consequently, the subject has to view itself as a 
spatio-temporal substance too, that is, as a body. 
That this thought, derived from the analogies of experience, is pertinent to the 
Refutation-argument is supported by a passage in Kant’s General Note on the System of 
the Principles.71 The quoted passage, then, can be reconstructed as a piece of 
hypothetical reasoning. Here, conclusion (C1') reappears as premise (P): 
(P3) my actual empirical consciousness is necessarily an actual cognition of my 
existence in time as a substance, necessarily only if it is possible for me to cognize 
my existence as a substance determined in time, 
(P) for me to cognize my existence as a substance determined in time is possible, 
necessarily only if there are actual things in my outer perception; 
(C2) hence my actual empirical consciousness is necessarily an actual cognition of 
my existence in time as a substance, necessarily only if there are actual things in my 
outer perception. 
                                                          
70 On the notion of “empirical consciousness” cf. B XL, 207f., 217f.; Ak. XVIII: 617; Guyer 1983: 343 – 
345; Allison 2004: 276 – 279, 289 – 291. 
71 B 291f. 
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Following Kant, the adverb “necessarily” in the antecedent of (P3) ought to be 
considered as governing the relationship between the predicate term “actual cognition of 
my existence in time as a substance” and the subject term “actual empirical 
consciousness”,72 and the second instance of “necessarily” as governing the conditional. 
What accounts for the necessity in the first premise (in the view I ascribe to Kant) is the 
relational category of accident and substance; in the second premise it is the relational 
category of causality.73 
However, on this reading Kant’s reasoning may appear needlessly complicated, 
since the expression of possibility occurring through out the reasoning is not present in 
the conclusion (C2). A simpler proof can be given by writing premise (P1) with the 
antecedent of (P3), and dropping the adverb “possible”.74 If this reconstruction is judged 
superior, the passage quoted above ought to be seen as a clarification and not as an 
additional step in the argument. 
For the concern of this paper it is not required to decide which reading is to be 
preferred. The important point is that Kant regards the necessary connection of 
antecedent and consequent as involving epistemic immediacy. This is clear from Kant’s 
gloss on the final conclusion:75 
Therefore [consciousness in time] is also necessarily combined with existence of the 
things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e. the consciousness of my 
own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other 
things outside me. (B 276) 
 
The same thought is expressed in the preface of the Critique.76 This certainly supports 
the argument that Kant’s strategy is not to demonstrate that consciousness of external 
things is not mediate because it leads to inconsistency, but that it is necessarily, hence, 
immediately, combined with inner experience, and therefore not mediate. His argument 
is a direct refutation of the “powerful objection against [the] rules for proving [the] 
                                                          
72 Cf. “[T]he absolute necessity of the judgement is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the 
predicate in the judgement.” (A 593f./B 621f.) 
73 On the necessity of the relational categories cf. B 201, fn. 
74 Dominique Kuenzle pointed this out to me. 
75 It would be beside the point to criticise that the conclusion does not mention the necessary relationship 
between empirical consciousness and consciousness as a substance in time. Kant’s notion of “empirical 
consciousness” is a reconstruction of the Cartesian consciousness. The reading presented here is precisely 
a clarification of the relationship between the conclusion quoted above and what it is intended to refute. 
76 “[T]he reality of outer sense is necessarily bound up with that of inner sense, i.e., I am just as certainly 
conscious that there are things outside me to which my sensibility relates, as I am conscious that I myself 
exist determined in time.” (B XLI, fn.) 
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existence [of things] mediately … made by idealism.”77 These principles, referred to as 
“rules for proving existence mediately”, may include the analogies of experience. If so, 
the passage contains information regarding the way the Refutation-argument goes 
beyond the analogies. But the following argumentation only relies on the contrast 
between “inferential” and “immediate”. 
The doubts of the idealist about “proving existence mediately” can be related to 
the objection against “inferring outer things” in the first note to the proof: “Idealism 
assumes that the only immediate experience is inner experience, and that from that outer 
things could only be inferred, but, as in any case in which one infers from given effects 
to determinate causes, only unreliably.” (B 276) Consequently, one could not 
understand the Refutation’s purpose if its object was to prove that empirical self-
consciousness proves the existence of external things, since this is precisely what the 
quoted objection challenges. Instead, it has to establish that their connection is non-
inferentially immediate. If this is correct, Kant’s formulation of the theorem of the 
Refutation of Idealism is inappropriate: “The mere, but empirically determined, 
consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside 
me.” (B 275) This proposition is neither what is nor what ought to be established. 
Instead, the proper reply to the idealist is the following. In order to comprehend 
the entire flow of actual representations and recollections as my experience of 
something, I need to cognize these representations as determinations of my existence as 
something permanent. Obviously, the idealist cannot infer from his intuitive 
representations a permanent thing as possessor of these representations, for he could not 
infer external objects from inner experience, if he was himself an inferred external 
object. The subject as a substance has to be brought into the reach of intuitive cognition, 
and, consequently, to be located in time. But to locate oneself as a substance with ones 
representations as accidental modifications in time one needs to view these 
modifications as systematically dependent from other substances. Hence, it is not that 
one has inner experience and can conclude on this basis that there are outer objects, but 
that in order to comprehend ones intuitive representations as experience in the first 
place one has to view them as causally dependent from external substances. 
                                                          
77 B 274f. In contrast, Henry Allison, in his seminal work Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, views the 
Refutation expressly as a reductio (cf. Allison 2004: 288f.) 
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However, this reasoning only yields a conditional for a conclusion. It does not 
amount to a proof of the external world. So, why don’t we add the categorical premise 
that we have inner experience and reason to the conclusion that there are actual things in 
our outer perception? That this would be inappropriate can perhaps be best supported by 
reading again how Kant rephrases his result: “[T]he consciousness of my own existence 
is at the same time an immediate consciousness of other things outside me.” (B 276) 
The conclusion expresses a conceptual dependency of “inner experience” and “external 
world”. What the Refutation of Idealism establishes then, is that there is no purely inner 
experience. If this is correct, there is no independent basis for a proof of the external 
world either. 
This result should not be viewed as a disappointment. It’s just that Kant’s 
strategy of obstacle-removal does not overcome the veil of ideas but rather dissipates it; 
he deprives the idealist of the requisite conceptual means for developing his “powerful 
objection”.78 In the third note to the proof, Kant underlines that its conclusion does not 
make all intuitive representations of external objects true; it merely draws a boundary 
for self-knowledge in the face of massive error: inner experience cannot be entirely 
veridical when outer experience is entirely illusory.79 
 
 
3.  What the Refutation-argument is designed to refute 
Giving an account of the positive import of the argument involves elaborating its 
conclusion, how it is achieved and, more specifically, answering why external objects 
are required (for inner experience). This, I believe, has been accomplished in the last 
section. However, we have only seen ad limine how transcendental arguments explain 
the possibility of empirical knowledge. The experience-enabling function of the 
categories has to be set out in more detail, which will occur later in this paper. 
An account of the negative import of the argument consists in explaining what it 
refutes and how. Since the idealist’s position is disproved by means of a direct 
refutation, that is, by establishing that consciousness of external object is immediate, the 
                                                          
78 The contrast between obstacle-overcoming and obstacle-dissipating responses is Cassam’s. The first 
involves accepting an obstacle and showing a way how to deal with it; the second consists in arguing that 
the obstacle is in some way spurious (Cassam 2007: 25, 30, 162). 
79 B 278f.; cf. Allison 2004: 297. 
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how-part has already been covered. So what is still at issue is to expound the idealist 
position more thoroughly. 
It may seem somewhat late to ask what it is that the Refutation-argument is 
designed to refute. But a more detailed exposition of idealism will serve as further 
confirmation and clarification of what has been said about the aim of the argument. The 
Refutation of Idealism is often presented with an emphasis on an alleged direct relation 
between the perception of things outside us and the consciousness of the temporal order 
of representations in inner experience. According to the view supported here, it is the 
idealist’s conception of the subject that raises the difficulty, which, as a consequence, 
undercuts the status of the series of representations and recollections as a whole. Put 
simply, if the subject is dubious, inner experience as somebody’s experience will be 
dubious too. Besides, if Kant did not consider the subjective temporal order of 
representations as given, it would not only be insufficient ground for determining the 
subject itself in time; it would be no ground at all.80 
Cassam remarks that the Refutation of Idealism won’t have any force against a 
sceptic who is prepared to question inner experience, and that it does not eliminate the 
possibility that we are brains in a vat.81 It is, I believe, important for the comprehension 
of the Refutation-argument to see that this is essentially correct. It has no force against 
one who is sceptical about inner experience, and, for that very reason, does not 
eliminate the possibility of a brains-in-a-vat scenario. However, as will be argued in this 
paper’s conclusion, this does not leave us without means for finding out if we are brains 
in a vat or not. But Cassam’s remark is also relevant for our present concern, since it 
clearly states for whom the Refutation-argument is not designed. 
Before stating his theorem, Kant declares that it is directed against Descartes’s 
“problematic idealism”. Exploiting the first edition’s fourth paralogism, problematic or 
empirical idealism can be characterized using four empirical propositions: 
(EI1) our cognitive faculties are such that we cannot immediately perceive the 
existence of outer appearances but only infer it as causes of what is in us 
(EI2) only the existence of what is in us can be immediately perceived 
                                                          
80 “[A]ll grounds of determination of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and 
as such require something [permanent] … in relation to which their change … can be determined.” 
(B XXXIX/B 275) 
81 Cassam 2007 54f.; Cassam 2008 [= “Reply to Stroud”]: 533f. 
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(EI3) the existence of outer appearances is doubtful 
(EI4) I exist as a thinking substance 
If we add the principle to the list that whose existence must be inferred from its effects 
is doubtful, the proposition (EI3), the uncertainty of the existence of outer appearances, 
can be justified as the conclusion of an argument. This is the argument that defines 
problematic idealism. Idealism is the doctrine of the doubtfulness or uncertainty of outer 
appearances.82 It is this reasoning Kant referred to as a “powerful objection against [the] 
rules for proving existence mediately”.83 But to recognize the target of the Refutation-
argument accurately, the fourth claim is decisive—“I exist as a thinking substance”. The 
target is not Descartes’ altogether sceptical First Meditation, but rather the Second 
Meditation after securing the existence of the subject as thinking substance. Here only 
are both of the claims, (EI3) and (EI4), which are required for the Refutation to start, 
achieved.84 
According to Kant, idealism, the doctrine of the uncertainty of outer 
appearances, presupposes transcendental realism. Kant identifies this position with the 
claim that what he views as connections between certain concepts necessary for 
enabling experience are, according to transcendental realism, necessary connections in 
principles determining things in themselves.85 In a less abstract way, transcendental 
realism claims that 
(TR1) space and time, and therefore outer appearances, are things in themselves 
(TR2) to cognize objects in themselves they need to be given as they are in 
themselves 
Kant does not state (TR2) explicitly, but I follow Allison in taking it to be an expression 
of the transcendental realist’s tacit epistemological ideal against which human cognition 
can never measure up.86 What connects both claims is the notion that for things to be 
cognized is purely accidental and, since what things are is given independent of all 
cognitive activities, full cognition is mere reproduction. Now, if certainty is to be 
attained, things in themselves have to be grasped on the model of ideas in our own 
                                                          
82 A 366 – 369; A 491/B 519; Prol. 293. 
83 B 274f. 
84 A.T. VII: 23 – 29. 
85 This description is extracted from A 297/B 353 and A 369. 
86 Allison 2004: 28. 
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mind, since every processing implies mediacy and uncertainty. A corresponding 
cognitive power would be intellectual, since it would need to grasp the inner properties 
of its object, yet at the same time non-discursive and immediate, like intuition. 
It has been said that, according to Kant, problematic idealism “presupposes” 
transcendental realism. This notion has been adopted in order to not include a logical 
inference. For an inference to flow, human cognition has to be contrasted with the ideal 
of an intellectual intuition of things in themselves. Thus, the two transcendental claims 
do not logically imply problematic idealism because such an inference has to use a 
proposition about human cognition from the EI-list as a premise. 
A word about transcendental idealism is unavoidable. Many interpreters 
understand Kant’s thesis on the transcendental ideality of space as denying that things 
which we perceive as spatially extended really are extended.87 While this is a conflation 
of the transcendental ideality of space with the empirical ideality or mind-dependency 
of space,88 what is required is the attempt to understand how “the reality (i.e. objective 
validity) of space in regard to everything that can come before us externally as an 
object” is compatible with “its transcendental ideality … as soon as … we take it as 
something that grounds the things in themselves”.89 Admittedly, this is one of the most 
difficult problems in Kant’s Critique, and there is no space to discuss it here.90 
 
 
4.  The Cartesian ego 
Kant views the thinking substance’s lack of intuitive cognition as the only imperfection 
within problematic idealism.91 Accordingly, if the purely conceptual “I think”, which 
can accompany all representations, were to be combined with the subject’s intellectual 
intuition, problematic idealism would be irrefutable. This underlines the importance of 
the presupposition of the Refutation-argument that any cognition requires concepts as 
well as intuitions. 
                                                          
87 “[Kant’s] transcendental idealism commits him to denying that the objects which we perceive as spatio-
temporal really are spatio-temporal.” (Cassam 2007: 79) 
88 A 45f./B 62f., B 69 – 71. 
89 A 27f./B 43f. 
90 For a discussion cf. Prauss 1974: 12 – 61; Allison 2004: 50 – 73 (chap. 3). 
91 B XL. 
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But if the latter is legitimate with regards to Descartes is not clear. According to 
Descartes, it is not by imagination or perception that we grasp the nature of an object, 
but by means of the intellect.92 This is relevant to the aim of the Second Meditation to 
establish the meditator as a substance and thinking as its internal determination, since at 
this stage in his reasoning, Descartes only allows necessary truths,93 which cannot be 
captured by the senses. 
However, Kant’s presupposition is less demanding than it may appear. It only 
requires immediate consciousness of the thinking substance as determinable in the 
temporality of inner intuition. Since Descartes cannot infer the existence of the ego with 
thinking as its essential property, it is unavoidable that he claims immediate 
consciousness of oneself as a substance in time. Existence and essence of the self have 
to be cognized immediately, if the external world is to be repudiated as accessible only 
by inference. According to Kant, Descartes could only believe that this is feasible 
because he mistook a purely structural feature of consciousness for an essential property 
of a substance. In reality this substance is not to be met at all in the temporality of inner 
sense (for it is spatial). Here the introductory passage of the Paralogisms is pertinent: 
 
At the ground of [the pure doctrine of thinking beings] we can place nothing but the 
simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation I, … a mere consciousness 
that accompanies every concept. Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, 
nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x. … The 
proposition “I think” is … taken here [i.e. in the pure doctrine of thinking beings] only 
problematically … If more than the cogito were the ground of our pure rational 
cognition of thinking beings … [it] could [not] serve to teach apodictically about 
thinking beings in general something touching on their nature[.] (A 345 – 347/B 403 – 
406) 
 
It has to be kept in mind that only apodictic truths are allowed in the Second Meditation 
. This is why thinking has to be a universal and necessary feature of the ego. Now, the 
“I think”, Kant says, can be taken either in its pure meaning, which is suited to 
accompany every representation of consciousness in general, or as claiming something 
about an empirical person. If it is taken in the former sense, it is apodictically true about 
a first-person perspective in general, but entirely empty. In the latter sense it has 
propositional content, it contains “I exist”, but it cannot serve as a determination of 
                                                          
92 A.T. VII: 30 – 34. 
93 A.T. VII: 27. 
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consciousness in general. The “I think” in the former sense is empty precisely because it 
is so general, yet it is the only universal trait of all subjective content. Since it cannot be 
intuitive, it is not in itself cognition and certainly not cognition of a substance. 
“[T]his I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks”, it was claimed, cannot be 
determined in the temporality of inner sense alone. In other words, it is not temporally 
determinable from the first-person perspective without presupposing spatial objects. 
This can be seen more clearly through making an attempt. Thus, we grant that the 
problematic idealist is able (a) to identify and recall representations and memorize their 
temporal order, (b) that he is able to ascribe these representations to his purely logical 
self, and (c) that he can, at will, unite a set of intuitive ideas and their recollections to a 
purely theoretical object. 
Now, first we let him say: “I must have a permanent existence, since as long as 
there are perceptions I have to be there too as the perceiver.” 
But, that personal pronoun, “I”, cannot refer to a representation in the inner 
sense. Since the subject is precisely that which ascribes these representations to itself, it 
cannot itself be a representation. But if it is not a representation, the problematic 
idealist’s subject cannot be experienced by him at all, or, as Allison puts it, inner sense 
does not have any data on the “soul as such”.94 This is supported by the fact that the 
temporal relations “before”, “after”, “at the same time” etc., which hold between the 
ideas in inner intuition, cannot be applied by the problematic idealist to his own subject. 
He cannot say (in the same sense as we do) “before, I was at my desk”—for in relation 
to what? His “desk” is only a series of ideas. 
To this the idealist replies: “I may not be able to relate to my subject ‘before’ or 
‘after’. But it is undeniable that I exist presently or as long as I perceive something and 
this sufficiently demonstrates my permanence.” 
We object that the present is not sufficient for determining the subject as a 
substance in time. Since “there is only one time,”95 the subject has to be relatable to 
“before” and “after” if it is relatable to “now”. For the same reason, it is doubtful that 
the present is genuinely related to the subject as a substance. This doubt is confirmed 
when recognizing that the present is related jointly to the subject and to everything there 
is over and above the subject. Thus, it is not that the idealist cannot relate the present to 
                                                          
94 Allison 2004: 278. 
95 A 188/B 232. 
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himself but that he cannot avoid relating it to too many things at once. Consequently, no 
backdrop remains in relation to which the subject could determine itself as being in the 
present. 
Put another way, the idealist claimed that he has immediate consciousness of 
himself as a substance in time, and argued that he must be a persistent thing as long as 
he perceives something. This “as long as” is intended to determine his subjecthood in 
time and to prove that he has immediate consciousness of himself. But this appears 
compelling only because he treats the thin concept of the ego as if it were an empirical 
person. If the ego is already an empirical person, the idealist could view experience as 
the temporally structured totality of modifications to his substance, that is, as mere ideas 
or representations. But since the ego is only an empty, determinable something and 
everything else (i.e. the whole “world”) is its “modifications”, it is no help to say that as 
long as these modifications occur it has to be “present”, since these are viewed in turn 
as being relative to the subject. Consequently, the result of his reasoning amounts to no 
more than this: “I perceive, therefore I am—the world.” 
In order to determine itself as a substance in time, the problematic idealist, in 
inner sense, needs to distinguish changes that are due to him from changes that are due 
to the way an independent world is. This is precisely the role of the analogies of 
experience. Kant describes them as “principles of the determination of the existence of 
appearances in time”. Since the application of the analogies results in acknowledging 
spatial objects, the problematic idealist would cease to be one. But if he refuses to 
distinguish objective from subjective change, he is left without the possibility of 
determining himself as a substance in time, simply because there is no other thing left in 
relation to which that could be done. 
The idealist may reply: “I can compound sets of intuitive ideas to theoretical 
objects, and determine myself as a thinking substance with regard to them.” 
To this one would reply that assuming hypothetical objects is viable, if the 
idealist’s subject was an empirical person, and the posited objects were in accordance 
with the unity of experience. But, since the thinking substance is a theoretical object 
itself, it cannot be determined through other theoretical objects compounded of ideas, 
that is, if the possibility of independent confirmation remains precluded. 
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5.  A reply to Cassam 
In connection with the preceding section, a few words on the analogies of experience 
are necessary. This will outline a reply to Cassam’s charge that transcendental 
arguments are irrelevant for answering the question of how experience is possible. As 
stated, applying the analogies draws the line between objective and subjective changes 
of representations. The second edition of the Critique presents a proof for each one of 
the three analogies of experience. It would be unproblematic to show that these are all 
transcendental proofs. Accordingly, it is more pressing to clarify their experience-
enabling function. 
“Experience”, Kant explains, is a “kind of cognition requiring the understanding 
…, whose … rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience 
must … necessarily conform.”96 Experience, therefore, presupposes the pure concepts 
of the understanding (i.e., the categories). This is an indication of the experience-
enabling function of the categories. Other passages underscore the role of sense-
perception: “Experience … is a cognition that determines an object through 
perceptions.” (A 176/B 218) Here, the opposition between the singular of “experience” 
(Erfahrung) and the plural of “perceptions” (Wahrnehmungen) suggests the relationship 
between the two accounts: experience is the unity of perceptions in accordance with the 
rule of understanding.97 Kant will sometimes even insinuate that talk of “experiences” is 
derivative and improper, for there is only one experience, of which “experiences” can 
be no more than parts.98 It is this “unitary” reading I would like to stress. 
We turn then, to the analogies of experience. It is through them that the 
relational categories (inherence/subsistence, causality and interaction) are applied to 
objects in time. The third analogy can be phrased like this: “To ascertain a state of 
affairs as co-present I have to view myself as a substance in space that interacts with 
them.”99 The following is an illustration of the pertinence of this rule. 
A person is standing on a planet and observes a star. It slowly wanders at an 
acute angle towards the horizon and vanishes. Another star appears and after some time 
                                                          
96 B XVII. 
97 Cf. the phrase “synthetic unity of perceptions, i. e., … experience” (A 183/B 226). 
98 A 110/A 230/B 282f. 
99 This formulation departs from Kant’s in that it is narrower for reasons of exposition. I prefer Kant’s 
wording in the first edition rather than the second: ”All substances, insofar as they are simultaneous, 
stand in thoroughgoing community (i.e., interaction with one another).“ (A 211) 
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it occupies the exact same spot as the first star. It is possible that, contrary to 
appearance, these two stars (assuming they are not identical) are objectively co-present. 
This would be the case if the observer moved or was moved by the revolving planet. 
This situation would be similar to one in which somebody standing in a rectangular 
room could not bring the opposing corners into one perspective because the room was 
too large. To experience them as co-present one would have to let the eyes roam from 
one angle to the other. Despite the fact that only succeeding perceptions of the opposite 
angles are available, they are there “at the same time”. 
To achieve such an objective time determination of situations, the subjective and 
reversible order of perceptions can be helpful only if other sequences are viewed as 
necessarily fixed. This is where Kant’s relational categories come in. The objective 
temporal order of states of affairs can be ascertained only if one’s order of perceptions 
is viewed as causally dependent on the movements of oneself as a spatio-temporal 
substance. This “dependency” is the “interaction” in the formulation of the third 
analogy above. The analogies of experience are rules for how to proceed with passively 
received perceptions. How the categories make experience possible, that is, what their 
role is in a systematic and objective unification of perceptions becomes tangible in the 
analogies, since they can be phrased as instructions on how to proceed.100 It is hard to 
see why they should not be, in a radical sense, “ways of knowing” or “pathways to 
knowledge”. And since their validity is established using transcendental arguments, the 
Kantian approach is no less “means-specific” than Cassam’s. 
 
 
6. Brains in a vat 
In this final section an outline of the Refutation’s relationship to Hilary Putnam’s 
brains-in-a-vat scenario will be offered. The way in which a Kantian attitude relates to a 
more radical sceptic who is prepared to question the inner experience will also be 
examined. The corresponding problem is introduced in the sole footnote to the 
Refutation-passage, thus raising the question “do we only have an inner sense but no 
                                                          
100 Note that the analogies are not applied to “inner representations” in the usual sense. Instead they allow 
one to draw the distinction between the inner and the outer in the first instance, and to locate the subject 
as a corporeal substance in the latter. 
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outer one, rather merely an outer imagination”.101 Put another way, we concede that we 
perceive outer things and deal with our perceptions according to the analogies of 
experience, and ask whether or not we could nevertheless be brains in a vat.102 The 
answer is that, obviously, we can. 
At first sight, this seems to be a counter example for the conclusion of the 
Refutation-argument. But, according to the view supported here, the conclusion is a 
conditional, and being a brain in a vat renders the antecedent just as false as the 
consequent. It precludes perceptions of external objects as well as self-consciousness as 
a substance in time. 
This first becomes evident when allowing for the possibility of massive 
deviation between time as it is experienced by the person whose brain is captured and 
the time the brain really is in a vat. It could be just as is the case when dreaming: a 
dreamed course of events is experienced as being much longer than the corresponding 
time of rapid eye movement sleep. Second, to be a brain in a vat undercuts the 
immediate consciousness of one’s body and its parts. If such a person’s brain was 
reconnected with real sense organs, she could learn for example that “her” brain is 
really the brain of a person who is very similar to somebody she believed to be her 
father, whereas the person she believed herself to be, was never born. 
What is Kant’s reaction to the problem of an imaginary outer sense? His answer 
in the footnote is generally considered to be insufficient.103 The sketch of a more cogent 
(and modest) rejoinder can be found in a passage from the Fourth Paralogism of the A-
edition: “[I]f [the perceived objects] were not real in space, i.e., immediately given 
through empirical intuition, then it could not also be invented, because one cannot just 
think up the real in intuition a priori.” (A 375) The thought is that empirical content 
cannot be made up without involving our receptivity. This is true even in the case of 
dreams and in brains-in-a-vat scenarios. The difference here is that our receptivity is 
involved in a way that makes it impossible to engender empirical knowledge. But, this 
is not a strict impossibility, since empirical content can in principle always be retraced 
                                                          
101 B 276. 
102 The locus classicus reads: “The person’s brain … has been removed from the body and placed in a vat 
of nutrients which keeps the brain alive. The nerve endings have been connected to a super-scientific 
computer which causes the person whose brain it is to have the illusion that everything is perfectly 
normal. There seem to be people, objects, the sky, etc.” (Putnam 1981: 5f.) 
103 Cf. Allison 2004: 294f. 
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to its origin, the real. 
Here, it is important to note a fundamental difference between the debates. From 
the start, Putnam concedes the central issue between Kant and Descartes, namely our 
bodily existence. Consequently, for the person being a brain-in-a-vat, reality is 
transcendent (empirically inaccessible) only for reasons of physical arrangement. It is in 
principle accessible if the brain is reconnected with functioning sense-organs. For a 
subject caught in such an arrangement, the empirical method is the best method for 
finding out whether the perceived world is real or not, because there could be 
programming errors causing breaks in the virtual reality so that the subject could begin 
to suspect that ‘reality’ is not what it seems to be. In contrast, Descartes’s genius 
malignus at least suggests that the delusion could be realised by means of supernatural 
and consequently undetectable influence.104 
The subject is fooled either causally as in Putnam’s thought experiment or by 
supernatural powers. In the first case, empirical methods would in principle be able to 
discover the delusion; in the second case, it would remain inscrutable, but without 
affecting the immanent truth of the assertions that are justified according to our 
standards. Where everybody is fooled, the unity of nature collapses; the fooling lies 
beyond possible experience, it is a “transcendent fooling” and therefore inconsequential. 
As a result, only Putnam’s sceptical scenario remains in the field. The Refutation of 
Idealism is inappropriate for proving that we are not in fact brains-in-a-vat or in similar 
distress. That question can only be resolved by means of empirical methods. It does not 
lie within the scope of a transcendental approach.105 
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104 Descartes’s genius malignus is not to be seen as a hypothesis governing the methodical doubt of every 
stage (consequently not analogous to Putnam’s super-scientifc computer); instead the genius malignus is 
the epistemologist’s heuristic model whose function is to block propositions from being allowed 
prematurely due to habit (cf. A.T. VII: 22f.). This is wholly disregarded here. 
105 I would like to thank Vanessa Morlock for her patience and Reinhard Heckmann for discussions on 
Kant’s philosophy and some ideas of this paper. 
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